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The Naturalistic Epistemology of Hume and
Wittgenstein
Dawit Dame
Introduction
David Hume is well known for his skepticism on a
wide range of topics, such as causation, the existence of a
world external to the mind and the existence of an enduring
self. As a result of this, the negative aspect of Hume’s
philosophy often clouds the extent to which he wants to
ground his epistemology in positive natural facts about
humans. Wittgenstein never read Hume and nowhere is it
evident that Hume had any influence on Wittgenstein’s
works. Perhaps the only influence Hume had on
Wittgenstein is simply being a philosopher of a certain
tradition that Wittgenstein primarily sought to question.
Wittgenstein like Hume, however, is committed the view
that human knowledge, philosophical or otherwise, is
ultimately grounded in natural facts about human beings.
In this paper I will identify and discuss Hume’s and
Wittgenstein’s naturalism and argue that both Wittgenstein
and Hume seek to ground human knowledge on empirical
natural facts about humans. In drawing the parallel between
them, I will begin by discussing their respective negative
views on knowledge and then focus on those positive views
that in each case point towards a naturalism in their
philosophy. Since both Wittgenstein and Hume wrote on a
wide range of topics, I will only focus on certain important
aspects of their philosophy to serve as a tool for
understanding their naturalistic philosophical projects. I will
particularly focus on Hume’s writing on causation and
Wittgenstein’s view on understanding and rule following.
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1. The Negative View
1.1 Determine?
I use the term “negative” primarily to serve as a
general term to an aspect of Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s
philosophy to what some might refer to as skepticism.1 The
views discussed below are negative in a sense that they
emphasize what is not rather than what is. Since the purpose
of this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s
naturalism, I will briefly discuss some of their negative
views only in so far as it serves to illuminate their
naturalistic views. To a large extent, very few consider
Wittgenstein a skeptic, but skepticism is a term that is often
associated with Hume’s writing on causality. I will briefly
underline how Hume is not essentially a skeptic and how his
naturalism is distinct from skepticism for Hume later on.
An aspect of Hume’s philosophy that is considered
negative is his view on causality, particularly, the inference
from the observed to the unobserved.2 Hume in An Inquiry
Concerning Human Understanding classifies “all object of
human reason or inquiry” into two kinds: relation of ideas
and matters of fact (E, 25). He explains that relations of
ideas are the kind that are demonstrative. Demonstrative in
1

Wittgensteinian scholarship since the publication of Saul Kripke’s
“Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language”, has been divided into
pre-Kripke and post Kripke analysis. It is fair to say that Kripke is the
first to make an explicit analogy between Hume and Wittgenstein.
However, his analogy that compares Hume’s skepticism along with his
skeptical solution to Wittgenstein, has received wide array of criticism.
My goal in this paper is to discuss Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s naturalism
with respect to their “negative” views, and I do not intend to address the
finer points of a Kripkean comparison of the two.
2
Barry Stroud, Hume (Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1977), 42.
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the sense that their negation implies a contradiction. These,
as Hume points out, are the type that we find in “sciences of
geometry, algebra, and arithmetic”. For instance, the
proposition “[t]hat the square of the hypotenuse is equal to
the squares of the two sides…” (E, 25) is a form
demonstrative reasoning. According to Hume, “the certainty
and evidence of” the relation of ideas holds “ though there
never were a circle or triangle in nature”. (E, 25). Matters of
fact, on the other hand are propositions whose negation does
not lead to a contradiction. A proposition that claims “[t]hat
the sun will not rise tomorrow is no less intelligible a
proposition and implies no more contradiction than the
affirmation that it will rise.” (E, 25-26).
Hume asserts that “all reasoning concerning matter
of fact seems to be founded on the relation of cause and
effect”—after observing events of type A and type B, we
infer B to follow from a single event A. Essentially,
multiple constant conjunctions between events form the
basis of inference from an observed single event A to the
unobserved event B. Hume points out that matters of fact
reasoning by their very nature take the form of a chain of
justifications. Within the realm of posteriori reasoning, a
reason given for a certain event C is based on a fact B and
the reason for the fact B is followed by a fact A. A present
event C is justified by a chain of inter-temporal reasoning
that extends backward into the past. A reasoning of this
nature, therefore, relies on “the relation of cause and effect
and that this relation is near or remote, direct or collateral.”(
E. 27). A reasoning of this kind is posteriori because one
cannot establish the connection between cause and effect
without necessarily having had an experience where a series
of events A are followed by events B. It follows logically
that cause and effects could not be “discovered by a priori
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arguments.” Therefore, “every effect is a distinct event from
its cause” and any “conception” of its cause through a priori
argument “must be entirely arbitrary.” (E, 29).
What is at stake here is the idea of necessary
connection between events A and B. Hume wants to say
that there is nothing to be discovered, even with the
employment of demonstrative reasoning, that from an
observed event A the unobserved event B necessarily
follows. There is no necessary connection between a cause
and its effect; it is impossible to infer any specific effect
from just a single instance of the cause. Only through
repeated observations of events A being followed by events
B can we infer B having observed A.
Wittgenstein’s negative view could be illustrated
based on instances of his views on understanding. The idea
of rule following is embedded in what is considered human
understanding. Our notion of understanding entails grasping
a certain rule or direction and properly following it in all
circumstances considered. But what does it really mean to
understand, to follow a rule, Wittgenstein asks? Wittgenstein
imagines a scenario where A is writing a series of numbers
and B tries to guess what comes next by coming up with a
formula:
But are the processes which I have just described
here understanding? “B understands the principle of
the series” surely doesn’t mean simply: the formula
“an=…” occurs to B. For it is perfectly imaginable
that the formula should occur to him and that he
should nevertheless not understand. “He
understands” must have more in it than: the formula
occurs to him. And equally, more than any of those
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more or less characteristic accompaniments or
manifestations of understanding. (PI 152).
Here Wittgenstein points to an important aspect of
what we take to be understanding. The use of the word
“occur” is supposed to signify that understanding might be
thought of as a form of mental picture that comes to mind.
However, this is neither a sufficient nor a necessary
condition for understanding since it is imaginable that the
formula could appear in his mind but he may not understand
in the sense that the subject still might not be able to
continue with the series. In short, the picture fails to
determine his future use. Wittgenstein therefore considers
the possibility that understanding must be more than the
apparent “manifestations” or “accompaniments” of
understanding, such as the occurrence of a formula in the
head. The latter point is fleshed out in another passage:
Whence comes the idea that the beginning of a series
is a visible section of rails invisibly laid to infinity?
Well, we might imagine rails instead of a rule. And
infinitely long rails correspond to the unlimited
application of a rule. (PI 218).
This picture of rules as rails is a metaphor that
captures our ordinary conception of understanding of a rule.
When we understand a rule, it is assumed that future
applications of it could be read off, so to say, from it, the
rails serving as future applications of the rule. Thus, we
would be inclined to say that we can use a concept at any
point in time tn in the future. But how does a rule contain its
application? Wittgenstein presents this perplexity in a rather
‘absurd” situation where “a person naturally reacted to the
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gesture of pointing “by looking in the direction of the line
from the finger-tip to the wrist, not from the wrist to fingertip.”. Signs like pointing with a finger, according to
Wittgenstein, are apt to be interpreted and understood in an
infinite number of ways; thus, signs, rules, concepts,
formulas do not inherently contain their future applications.
Could understanding be an interpretation of a rule?
Wittgenstein retorts , “any interpretation still hangs in the air
along with what it interprets, and cannot give it any
support.”(PI 190). An interpretation is merely a substitution
of one sign post for another. Interpretations stand in need of
further interpretations leading to an infinite regress.
Put simply, when it comes to understanding we are
on our own. Understanding according to the above
discussion is a kind of a jab in the dark for there is nothing
about rules that determine our correct application of them at
any point in time. Just as Hume found no necessary
connection between two events A and B, such that the
occurrence of B is determined by the occurrence of A.
Wittgenstein found nothing in the rule being followed that
determines its future applications. “Thus, we think of future
or possible use as present ‘in a queer way’, by being already
contained in what the mind does when something is meant –
in particular, by being conscious after the manner of an
image.”3 Wittgenstein’s problem of meaning and
understanding is thus summarized:
3

Colin McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning,(Oxford: Basil Blackwell,
1984), 9. Also consider this from Philosophical Investigations. “we say,
for example, that a machine has(possesses) such-and-such possibilities
of movement; we speak of the ideally rigid machine which can only
move in such-and-such a away.—What is this possibility of movement?
It is not the movement, but it does not seem to be the mere physical
conditions, for moving either—as, that there is play between socket and
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We are tempted to think that the action of language
consists of two parts: an inorganic part--the handling
of signs—and an organic part, which we may call
understanding these signs, meaning them,
interpreting them. These latter activities seems to
take place in a queer medium, the mind. The
mechanism of the mind-- the nature of which, it
seems, we don’t quite understand—can bring about
effects that no material mechanism could. (BB, p.3)
Hume, however, departs from Wittgenstein in one
major way. Hume believed that if a necessary connection is
not to be found in the relation between objects, it is to be
looked for, and perhaps be found in, human subjects. A
careful empirical study of human psychology, Hume
believed, would reveal the ground of this idea of causal
determination. Hume thought that the empirical study of the
human mind would reveal the origins of why we think that
there is a necessary connection between events A and B. As
the last sentence of the above quote indicates, Wittgenstein
has a more radical form of negative view. He believes that
even an empirical study of the human mind will not reveal
the answer; it is a fruitless effort trying to find it in the
“inner” as opposed to the “outer” material world.4 It must be
pin not fitting too tight in the socket. For while this is the empirical
condition for movement, one could also imagine it to be otherwise. The
possibility of a movement is, rather, supposed to be like a shadow? And
by shadow I do not mean some picture of the movement---for such a
picture would not have to be a picture of just this movement. But the
possibility of this movement must be the possibility of just this
movement. (See how high the seas of language run here!)”
4

Wittgenstein will not deny that there are natural, psychological
associations we make in the realm of meaning and understanding. He
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stressed, however, that Wittgenstein here has a Cartesian
conception of the “inner” as opposed to the material
mechanism by which the mind works as far as questions of
understanding are concerned. Even an over emphasis of the
latter is of grave concern to Wittgenstein.
1.2 The Negative and its challenges
Assuming that the negative view thus presented
above paints a picture of skepticism, any attempt to answer
Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s challenge must tell us why our
reasoning takes the form it does at arriving at conclusions
about causation, understanding and meaning. Moreover, a
philosophically satisfactory answer to the question why must
meet the following three conditions5: It must
1. explain our unshakable conviction in our
ordinary world view
2. establish the impossibility of providing our world
view with a rational justification
3. explain 1 and 2 without making it appear that
“our everyday conviction is hasty or dogmatic, or
involves some kind of error, illusion, mistake, or
make-believe.”6

will disagree with Hume, however, in that the concept of understanding,
the logical understanding is to be found in the mental. See. McGinn,
Wittgenstein on Meaning, 4-5.
5
These conditions have been adopted from Martin Bell and Mary
McGinn, “Skepticism and Naturalism.” Philosophy, 65, No.254(1990),
408.
6
Ibid., 408.
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2. The Positive View
2.1 What do I mean by “naturalism”?
Naturalism is a term employed in a variety of ways
in philosophy. It is difficult thus to find an allencompassing definition of naturalism in philosophy.7 In
contemporary philosophy it is often used to align
philosophical views with empirical science. What is
essential about these definitions is that in all of them the
word ‘naturalism’ denotes what could be investigated with
our present scientific tools, in contrast to the “supernatural”.
Outside these contemporary debates and in the spirit of
Wittgenstein’s philosophy I will attempt to find what
naturalism means in the way it has been used in
Wittgenstein’s and Hume’s writings.8
Hume and Wittgenstein dedicate a large portion of
their philosophy to addressing the negative challenge posed
by their respective philosophies. Within their philosophical

7

For some of the debate in contemporary definitions of naturalism see,
the debate between Quine and Stroud(W.V.O. Quine, "Epistemology
Naturalized." In Naturalizing Epistemology. Ed. by Hilary Kornblith(
Cambridge, MA.: The MIT Press, 1994); Barry, Stroud "The
Significance of Naturalized Epistemology." Midwest Studies in
Philosophy vol. VI The Foundations of Analytic Philosophy. Ed. by
Peter A. French et al. (Minneapolis MN: Minnesota Press, 1981)
8
Wittgenstein often emphasized the use of words in ordinary language
to mean different things at different times. Different usage of the same
word created what he called family resemblances; family resemblances
gave us a sense of what a word meant in general through a series of
overlapping similarities. Consider the beginning of a speech he gave on
Ethics to the London Heretics Society in 1929, “…And to make you see
the subject matter of Ethics I will put before you a number of more or
less synonymous expressions each of which could be substituted for the
above definition, and by enumerating them I want to produce the same
sort of effect which Galton produced when he took a number of photos
of different faces on the same photographic plate…”
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framework, they attempt to give a naturalistic explanation
that is in accord with the above three requirements.
Considered holistically this naturalistic view recognizes the
limitations presented to our philosophical selves by our
biological selves. As humans we are capable of observing
the world “from outside” and at the same time
unquestioningly follow nature. Hume recognized the
limitations of being a human animal in his philosophy and
sought to study the interaction between our animalistic and
instinctual being and our reflective rational being. According
to Stroud, “the real philosophical value of Humean study of
human nature lies in neither position on its own, but in the
illumination gained from the constant and inevitable passing
to and fro between” nature and philosophy9. For
Wittgenstein, the limitation is primarily manifested in the
extent to which language could be used to serve the demands
of philosophy. Some of the questions philosophy asks for
are simply not linguistically feasible. After all, “a tea cup
will only hold a tea cup full of water [even if] I were to pour
out a gallon over.” 10
Wittgenstein and Hume were both preoccupied with
the question of precisely where this limitation is to be found
in nature but it is also an area of difference between them.
Wittgenstein holds the view that this limitation lies in our
primitive capacity to be trained.11 Hume is interested in
giving what Stroud calls a “causal theory about the origins
of our beliefs in causality”. Hume’s theory is naturalistic in a
9

Stroud, Hume, 249.
Ludwig Wittgenstein, “Lectures on Ethics.” In Philosophical
Occasions, edited by James Klagge and Alfred Nordmann, (Indianapolis
& Cambridge: Hackett Publishing Company, 1993), 40.
11
McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 168.
10
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sense that he sought to find the answer regarding causality in
the human subject.
Let us take an instance of Wittgenstein’s writing to
illustrate what is meant by “natural”. The most illuminating
meaning of the word natural in Wittgenstein’s writing
appears in Lectures on the Foundations of Mathematics. In a
number of similar instances, Wittgenstein employs the word
“natural” to emphasize its primitive and foundational
characteristics. Wittgenstein, for instance, talks about a
group of people engaged in creating arithmetic. Suppose that
there is a technique for counting but not multiplication yet.
Suppose also that these mathematicians invent multiplication
for numbers up to 100. If a person well trained in the
technique of multiplication, for the very first time, is asked
to complete the multiplication of two numbers higher than
100, say, 112 and 200, we assume that he will probably do
what we would expected of him and produce the right
answer. Wittgenstein goes on to say, “this is an
experiment—and one which we may later adopt as a
calculation. What does that mean? Well, suppose that 90
per cent do it all one way. I say, “This is now going to be the
right result.” The experiment was to show that the most
natural (italics mine) way is—which way most of them go.
Now everybody is taught to do it—and now there is right
and wrong. Before there was not.” (LFM, 95).
For Wittgenstein “naturalism” is the primitive
behavior we exhibit in our untrained self and it lies on the
surface. By “on the surface” I mean that given the
multiplicity of meaning that could be derived from statement
or a rule (the negative view) there is no ‘inner’ meaning that
could be found in the rule. This idea has been well illustrated
in, but not restricted to, his famous Private Language
Argument. What essentially separates me, say, for a parrot,
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is not some “queer” mental phenomenon that takes place
inside my head when questions of understanding are raised.
It is rather my ability to express meaning and understanding
through use of examples and practical activities. Does this
imply that the parrot could be made to behave like me if we
train it? Wittgenstein’s answer would be no. A parrot does
not have the natural capacities required for that form of
training. By the same token, our “untrained” self would be
one that meets the minimum requirement. He wants to
divorce our association of knowledge, what determines
correctness and incorrectness, from a private mental
phenomenon. As to the question of how humans come to
have this minimum requirement, he would leave it to
biologist or the psychologist.
The idea of naturalism for Hume, however, is to be
found in the mental. If we cannot find the idea of necessary
connection with two successive events, we must find it in
the observer.12
Since, therefore, external objects as they appear to
the senses, give us no idea of power or necessary
connexion, by their operation in particular instances,
let us see, whether this idea be derived from
reflection on the operations of our own minds, and be
copied from any internal impression.(E, 64 )
After observing two successive events A and B regularly, we
form the idea of necessary connection in our mind; we form
a belief. The process of forming this belief comes to us
‘naturally’ because it is commonplace that “by the simple
command of our will, we can move the organs of our body,
12

Norman Kemp Smith, The Philosophy of David Hume, (London:
Macmillan and Co. Limited, 1949).
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or direct the faculties of our mind.”(E, 64). Thus, we can say
that one thing is ‘naturally’ related to another if the thought
of the first leads to the belief that the associated second will
‘causally’ follow.13 Resemblance, contiguity and causation
produce association between two events in our mind. Upon
encountering a picture of a friend, “our idea of him is
evidently enlivened by the resemblance [and] in producing
this effect, there concur both a relation and a present
impression.”(E, 51). At the same time, proximity in space
and time, contiguity, allows as to make an inter-temporal
causal inference between two objects. When I’m getting
close to home, through contiguity, I can make the inference
between my impressions of home (original idea) and my
present state of mind, because contiguity affords me
“superior vivacity” in understanding the causal interaction
between the two. Consequently, Hume provides what he
termed as the “natural” definition of cause and effect:
A CAUSE is an object precedent and contiguous to
another, and so united with it, that the idea of the one
determines the mind to form the idea of the other,
and the impression of the one to form a more lively
idea of the other. (T, 170).
Most importantly, Hume wants to say that this
“natural” definition of cause is equivalent to a
“philosophical” definition of cause.14 For him, both are
ways of “simply presenting a different view of the same
13

Stroud, Hume, 89.
Stroud, Hume; Robinson, “Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause””, The
Philosophical Quarterly, 12, No.47(1962); Roberts, “Hume’s Two
Definitions of “Cause””, The Philosophical Quarterly, 15, No.60(1965)
doubt that he fully succeeds in equivocating these two.
14
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object…[and] we may substitute [one for the other]”.(T,
170).
We may define a CAUSE to be ‘An object precedent
and contiguous to another, and where all the objects
resembling the former are plac’d in like relations of
precedency and contiguity to those objects, that
resemble the latter. ‘( T, 170).
The philosophical definition is supposed to
encompass all “objective relations that hold between the
things that we designate as causes and effects.”15 Hume’s
attempt in equating these two definitions is consistent with
his philosophical project of studying human behavior,
including our philosophical behavior and finding
explanations to philosophical questions in human
psychology.
Here then is the only expedient, from which we can
hope for success in our philosophical researches, to
leave the tedious lingering method, which we have
hitherto followed, and instead of taking now and then
a castle or village on the frontier, to march up
directly to the capital or center of these sciences, to
human nature itself; which being once masters of, we
may every where else hope for an easy victory. (T,
introduction, XX).
Hume sought to study the science of man grounded in nature
and aspired to provide to philosophy what Newton did for
science.16 He wanted to address philosophical questions not
merely through “hypothesis”, but through the empirical
15
16

Stroud, Hume, 88-89.
Ibid.
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study of humans in their natural habitat. If science
formulates theories from simple hypotheses, such as what
we commonly or naturally observe, then Hume might have
reasoned that our natural behavior could provide us a way to
formulate explanations of the relation between two events A
and B related through resemblance, contiguity and causeeffect.17 As sentient beings, we collect data through the
senses and this immediate sensual input is what he called
impressions. From these impressions we form ideas,
impression accompanied by inference. Pure inferences that
we derive from ideas are strictly speaking knowledge—the
impossibility of perceiving anything differently.18 In Hume’s
natural realm, there is nothing distinctly different about the
two different definitions; they are both different ways of
approaching the same subject without one being necessarily
superior. Thus, Hume’s Naturalism formulates a
fundamental, but empirical principle of the human mind: an
observed constant conjunction between events A and B fixes
a “union in the imagination” such that the thought of A
naturally leads the mind to the thought of B.
Questions of whether Hume’s two definitions of
causes are “definitions” in the philosophically satisfactory
sense of the word aside, an important point could be
glimpsed here that draws a parallel with Wittgenstein’s idea
of naturalism. If Wittgenstein had left his idea at the
17

Robinson, Hume’s Two Definitions of “Cause”, 165.
Stroud, Hume,(78) says, “for every idea there must be an impression ,
or impressions, from which that idea is derived…” and that Hume
searches of the source of the idea of necessary connection in the
impression they could have been deduced from. However, Hume does
not find impressions directly responsible for our ideas of necessary
connection and concludes that the mind is “determined” to form the idea
of necessary connection from repeated conjoined events.
18
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doorstep of naturalism, then Hume’s job is to take it inside.
In other words, Hume’s idea of naturalism sought to account
for the psychological phenomenon Wittgenstein did not
think worth going into. However, just as Wittgenstein
thought that our natural disposition provides a foundation for
mathematical theories and their subsequent criteria for their
correct or wrong use, Hume also believed that the basis for
the idea of a necessary connection is to be found in our
naturally formed beliefs about association of events. Both
agree that the answers to their negative views are to be
found in our primitive epistemological behavior; the
disagreement lies, if any, at the level of primitive-ness. In
the sections below, I will develop this idea further and assess
how it accounts for Hume’s and Wittgenstein’s negative
views.
2.2 How does Naturalism account for the problems
raised in the negative view:
The challenges posed by the negative view can be
answered by arguing that 1.) It is nature not reason that is
the ultimate foundation of all our factual beliefs, 2.) seeking
a rational justification for our “naturalistic” reasoning is
unwarranted, and 3.) we have an epistemic right to our
naturalistic justifications. How does naturalism, as discussed
above manifest, itself in addressing the negative concerns of
Hume and Wittgenstein?
2.2.1 Nature as a foundation of our factual beliefs
It comes in a form of habit or custom that, after
succession of similar events, we form an idea of necessary
connection, according to Hume. The precise mechanics of
how this idea of necessity is formed lies in the tendency of
the mind to be “determined” by such things as resemblance
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and contiguity to form the idea of “necessity and power.”
This creates “a great propensity[in the mind] to spread itself
on external objects” and ascribe necessity to them. Necessity
therefore is
“…the effect of this observation, and it is nothing but an
internal impression of the mind, or a determination to carry
out thoughts from one object to another.” ( T, 165) as well
as, “..something that exists in the mind not objects; nor is it
possible for us to ever to form the most distant idea of it,
consider’d as a quality in bodies.”( T, 165-6).
It must be noted that when Hume says that necessity is
something that is found in the mind, neither does he mean
that causality is strictly an ‘inner’ process and no such thing
as causality in the world, nor that objects of the world are
causally linked as a result of our minds.19 He means that
certain mental processes get triggered in the mind, in the
empirical sense, that ascribe necessity to objects.
Hume makes an analogy between necessity and
Lockean secondary qualities to reinforce his point that
necessity is something that exists neither in the physical
world nor in the mental.
Thus, as certain sounds and smells are always found
to attend certain visible objects, we naturally imagine
a conjunction, even in place, betwixt the objects and
the qualities, tho’ the qualities of such a nature as to
admit of no such conjunction, and really exist
nowhere.” (T, 167)
According to Hume, when we get a “feeling of
determination” from observed conjunction between events,
19

Stroud, Hume, 81.
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the mind projects itself on to the external world and this
feeling of determination manifests itself in the form of
necessity between two causal events. This is a fundamental
fact about human nature.
Wittgenstein will support Hume in saying that
regularity determines our convictions in our beliefs. A
regular use of a word (or rule) determines its future
application. “The repeated use that is required for there to be
meaning is something spread out over time; meaning is, so
to say, an essentially diachronic concept.”20 There are also
numerous occasions where Wittgenstein talks about use,
custom and practice as a foundation of knowledge and
understanding. He believes that there are primitive
instinctual faculties we posses before all knowledge of facts.
The systemization of these primitive instincts establishes
what we call “empirical facts”. Our custom or habit is thus a
systematic categorization of what is intelligible and what is
not. We begin to establish what is true and what is not from
a collective system of what Wittgenstein frequently referred
to as “a form of life”.
“So you are saying that human agreement decides
what is true and what is false?”—It is what human
beings say that is true and false; and they agree in the
language they use. That is not agreement in opinions
but in form of life. (PI, 241)
How do words refer to sensations?—There doesn’t
seem to be any problem here; don’t we talk about
20

McGinn, Wittgenstein on Meaning, 37, draws on an interesting
example of the “Two Minute England” taken from Wittgenstein’s
Remarks on the Foundations of Mathematics to illustrate the point that a
temporally truncated words like the “two minute England” are
meaningless.
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sensations every day, and give them names? But how
is the connexion set up? This question is the same as:
how does a human being learn the meaning of the
names of sensations?—of the word “pain” for
example. Here is one possibility: words are
connected with the primitive, the natural, expressions
of the sensation and used in their place. A child has
hurt himself and he cries; and then adults talk to him
and teach him exclamations and, later, sentences.
They teach the child pain-behavior. (PI, 244)
Groaning, moaning or crying are primitive pre-linguistic
behavior that “the language-game with ‘pain’ is rooted, not
in observation of private objects in an ethereal realm.”21 We
don’t ask a child why he is crying we simply proceed to
comfort him in the same way we do not question the
unmannered behavior of an untrained dog. Expressions such
“I have hurt myself”, “He’s in terrible pain” develop as
“learned extensions” of the manifestations of primitive
natural behavior.
2.2.2 Unwarranted rational justification of our
“naturalistic” beliefs
Both Wittgenstein and Hume provide their positive
views by an explicit acceptance of the impossibility of
providing a rational justification for their negative projects.
What is more important is that the negative view is only a
tool used to shift our attention to the positive view.
Wittgenstein in the Tractatus emphasizes that what is
expressed in it is only a way, a “ladder” to be thrown away
21

P.M.S Hacker, Wittgenstein Meaning and Mind (Oxford: Basil
Blackwell, 1990), 192.
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once we see “the world rightly”. This Wittgensteinian ladder
is exactly the role given to their negative views; it is a way
of forcing us see that the kind of factual justification we seek
is mistaken.22
At this juncture we can address the issue of whether
Hume is essentially a skeptic and point out how his
naturalism sets him apart from a thorough going skeptic.23
At the end of the Treatise Book I part IV, Hume makes it
clear that he is clearly not a skeptic.
Shou’d it be here asked me…whether I be really one
of those skeptics who hold that all is uncertain, and that our
judgment is not in any thing possesst of any measure of truth
and falsehood; I should reply that that this question is
entirely superfluous, and that neither I, nor any other person
was ever sincerely of that opinion.
Hume’s skepticism, especially with regard to
causation and inductive reasoning could, at best, be
described as “fallibilism”, the idea that our knowledge, in
principle, could be mistaken. (One might also consider his
critical stance on “metaphysics” a form of skepticism,
which, it must be pointed out, is clearly different from
philosophical skepticism).24 Consequently, Hume’s project,
like Wittgenstein’s, put in the right light, is not one that is
dedicated to providing an answer to a skeptical project, but
is rather an attempt to make us see that epistemological
22

Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, it must be pointed out, expresses
quite a different view of Wittgenstein on language and knowledge from
the one under discussion here.
23
The discussion of Hume and skepticism requires a full-length paper. I
will only provide a brief outline here.
24
Morris, William Edward, "David Hume", The Stanford Encyclopedia
of Philosophy (Summer 2009 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.),
URL=<http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2009/entries/hume/>.
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justification we are seeking is to be found in our naturalistic
dispositions.
Nature by an absolute and uncontrouble necessity
has determin’d us to judge as well as to breathe and
feel…Whosever has taken the pains to refute the
cavils of this total skeptic, has really disputed
without an antagonist, and endeavor’d by this
argument to establish a faculty, which nature has
antecedently planted in the mind, and render’d
unavoidable.”(T, 183)
In Wittgenstein’s positive system, the rejection of the
negative view is followed by a careful nullification at what
first appears like a skeptical problem. The controversy
surrounding Saul Kripke’s interpretation of Wittgenstein
(Wittgenstein on Rules and Private Language) has to do, to a
large extent, with whether Wittgenstein could be seen as
espousing “skeptical” views. Both sides of the debate will
agree that, if he did, it is meant to show the kind of
meaningful questions that could be asked. Bell and McGinn
in Naturalism and Skepticism identify two essential
characteristics of a negative challenge such as discussed
above, which for convenience sake we can term as a
skeptical challenge. The first of these is the skeptic’s
inability to find an objective world in experience as a source
of our knowledge, and the second of these is the skeptic’s
identification of ordinary judgments as empirical claims that
require independent evidence to be established as true.
Wittgenstein finds these as a fundamental misunderstanding
of the nature of ordinary practice. Wittgenstein repeatedly
points out that the role of judgments in ordinary practice
must not be taken out of context. It is easy fall into the trap
of believing that “our system of judgments is uniformly
epistemic.” If I say, “I’m in pain”, I find myself confronted
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with the same epistemic justification as “I have a penny in
my pocket”, two different claims that require different
justifications.
Giving grounds, however, justifying the evidence, comes
to an end;--but the end is not certain propositions’
striking us immediately as true, i.e. it is not a kind of
seeing on our part; it is our acting, which lies at the
bottom of the language-game.(OC, 204).
Moreover, Wittgenstein thinks that answering to the
skeptic’s challenge by looking for further evidence in
experience is futile; it is to fall into the skeptics trap for
experience itself is subject to many interpretations.
One wants to say "All my experiences show that it is
so". But how do they do that? For that proposition to
which they point itself belongs to a particular
interpretation of them. "That I regard this proposition
as certainly true also characterizes my interpretation
of experience." (OC, 145).
The process of understanding or rule following then is not to
be justified by appealing to a kind of justification that is
independent of our ordinary practice and custom. To
demonstrate our understanding is to engage in an activity
such as pointing, giving examples, and acting in accordance
with what is commonly accepted in a recognized language
game. Understanding is a skill, just like swimming or
playing chess, that is measured by how well we perform in a
given circumstance.
Hume goes at great length both in the Dialogues and
Book I of the Treatise into proving that we are incapable of
seeing the world outside our natural states as humans and we
hold on to two fundamental beliefs: 1.) objects of our
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perception have an independent persistent reality, and 2.)
nothing comes to existence without a pre-existing cause. All
skeptical doubts concerning the validity of these beliefs do
not target the truth or falsity of them rather they demonstrate
the absence of evidence for them, which is taken as a proof
of dogma. Hume believed that we lacked complete
knowledge of the ultimate reality and the skeptical doubts
carry no more weight than our naturalistic beliefs.25 The
employment of reason to justify or nullify our belief
“diminish [each other]…till at last they both vanish away
into nothing by a regular just diminution.”(T, 187). Thus,
the negative view’s challenge is merely a pedantic
requirement to qualify our naturalistic beliefs, and as far as
our custom goes it is unwarranted.
2.2.3 Epistemic right to naturalistic beliefs
It follows from the above discussions that if
justification is to be grounded in ordinary practice, we have
an epistemic right to our system of judgments. The
naturalistic view of Hume and Wittgenstein is thus an
attempt to preserve our ordinary system of justification.
Norman Smith Kemp in defending Hume’s naturalism states
that “what we call ‘reason,’ and oppose to our natural beliefs
is in reality nothing distinct from these beliefs; it is just the
de facto necessity we are under of following them, which
gives rise to the philosophical or ‘rational’ reaction against

25

Norman Smith, “The Naturalism of Hume(I.).” Mind, New Series, 14,
No. 54 (1905), 166.
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them.”26 When we discard Hume’s naturalistic beliefs, we
devolve into a Berkeleyian idealist where nothing exists
outside the mind. When we take them too seriously, they
lead us to “idle speculation” fueled by knowledge
demanding a sufficient cause for all things.
This does not mean that Hume wants to throw away
our rational way of seeking knowledge. He accepts that there
is part of our existence that we share with animals and then
there is a part of us that is rational, reflective, and
introspective. The latter is to serve the former; it is to guide
us in our quest for knowledge. Having the right to
knowledge claims of the kind discussed above should not
deter us from seeking true knowledge. This for Hume
requires adapting a “two-fold philosophical discipline: a
skeptical discipline to open [our] eyes to the deceptiveness
of the mistaken endeavors of [the mind] and a positive
naturalistic philosophy to mark out the paths upon which
[we] can confidently travel without any such attempted
violation of [our] human nature, and in furtherance of [our]
essential needs.”27
Language games are the key to Wittgenstein’s
naturalistic epistemology. Language games are to serve as a
reference to what we can consider as correct and incorrect.
Wittgenstein’s slogan “don’t think but look” is really an
attempt to draw out attention back to a natural way of
justifying and knowing as opposed to a “supernatural”
(Platonic) way of looking an underlying reason to be found
by a rigorous “thinking” devoid of ordinary practice. As
Bell and McGinn rightly point out the non-rational base of
our ordinary judgment has a particular role to play in our
26
27
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system of knowledge and that is practicality. “These
judgments have been shown to have a role in our practice
that makes the question of establishing them, justifying
them, completely out of place.”28
Evidently, both Hume and Wittgenstein were very
critical of a particular way of doing philosophy.
Wittgenstein opposed the Platonic sense of meaning and
essence independent of our practice. He is often quoted for
saying that philosophy does not provide thesis (and he did
try not to have a thesis). The task of the philosopher is
perhaps to clear up the mess and rearrange the some of the
clatter and mess created by our practice, but not to discover
truth. Hume has stressed that we should treat philosophy in
“a careless manner” and markedly differed from his British
predecessors in the way he approached ontology,
epistemology and ethics.
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